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ABSTRACT: 
In one of the first stand-alone studies covering the whole of the Indonesian 
banking industry, and utilising a unique dataset provided by the Indonesian central 
bank, this paper analyses the levels of intermediation-based efficiency obtaining 
during 2007.  Using Tone’s (2001) input-oriented, non-parametric, slacks-based DEA 
model, and modifying it where necessary to deal with negative inputs and outputs 
(Sharp et al. 2006), we firstly estimate the relative average efficiencies of Indonesian 
banks, both overall, and by group, as determined by their total asset size and status.  
In the second part of the analysis, we adopt Simar and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrapping 
methodology to eliminate the ‘bias’ in the efficiency estimates and to formally test for 
the impact of size and status on Indonesian bank efficiency. 
 The results from the initial analysis show that: (i) average bank efficiency 
within the industry during 2007 lay between 62% – 67%; (ii) the most efficient group 
of banks was the ‘state-owned’ group with an average efficiency score of over 90%, 
with the least efficient group being the ‘regional government-owned’ banks with 
average efficiency scores between 45% and 58%; (iii) ‘listed banks’ performed better, 
on average, than ‘non-listed banks’; and (iv) ‘Islamic banks’, despite their different 
operational structure when compared with conventional banks, enjoyed average 
efficiency scores between 54% and 74%.  In the second stage of the analysis, the bias-
corrected efficiency scores demonstrate that ‘regional government-owned’, ‘foreign 
exchange’, ‘non-foreign exchange’, ‘joint-venture’ and ‘foreign’ groupings were 
significantly less efficient than ‘state-owned’ banks, with the first-mentioned being 
the most inefficient and the other groupings ranked in ascending order of efficiency, 
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as listed.  Moreover, large banks were shown to be more efficient than their smaller 
counterparts, providing support for Bank Indonesia’s consolidation policies. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Empirical studies of bank efficiencies have mushroomed in recent years as 
interest has spread beyond banking markets in North America and Western Europe 
and modelling methodologies have evolved to tackle the increasingly-complex nature 
of banking operations and their diverse operating environments.  On the modelling 
front, there is a schism between the proponents of parametric and non-parametric 
approaches to assessing bank efficiencies, whilst elsewhere debates rage about the 
appropriate form of the input/output specifications – the traditional ‘intermediation-
based’ versus the ‘production’ or ‘profit/revenue’ approaches (see Drake et al., 2006) 
– to be adopted and the merits of allowing for slacks in non-parametric modelling 
This paper represents one of the first attempts, as far as the authors are aware, 
to analyse Indonesian banks on a stand-alone basis.  Moreover, the study is unique in 
that it uses, as a dataset, supervisory data provided by Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian 
central bank.  The analysis of banking markets in Indonesia is long overdue given the 
country’s growing importance within the resurgent region of South East Asia and its 
significance as a major ASEAN nation.  Moreover, it is one of only a few studies to 
analyse bank efficiency in this region since the end of the Asian financial crisis 
(1997/98).  Accordingly, it represents a timely and warranted addition to the extant 
empirical literature on banking efficiency, especially for the South East Asian region. 
As for our preferred methodology, for the reasons outlined below, we choose 
to adopt a non-parametric approach to efficiency estimation (input-oriented Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA)), based upon the intermediation activities of banks and 
accounting for output and input slacks.  This methodology is used to address the issue 
of how efficient Indonesian banks were during 2007 and which type of banks (by 
ownership and status, that is, listed/non-listed, Islamic/conventional) were the most 
efficient.  Furthermore, the differences in efficiencies, both between ownership 
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groups and different asset sized groups, were then formally tested using the 
bootstrapping procedures of Simar and Wilson (2007). 
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly set out the 
structure of the Indonesian banking system, highlighting the respective asset shares of 
the different groups.  In Section 3 we present the modelling methodology, duly 
explaining the reasons for our choice of approach, the nature of the dataset used, and 
the input/output variables deployed in the intermediation-based efficiency analysis.  
In Section 4 we set out our results, and explain their policy implications, and, in 
Section 5, we conclude the analysis. 
 
 
2.  THE INDONESIAN BANKING INDUSTRY: A BRIEF STRUCTURAL 
REVIEW 
 
 As shown in Table 1, at the end of 2007 there were 130 banks operating in 
Indonesia with a combined balance sheet of over IDR 1,986 trillion (US$ 213 billion).  
This comprised 5 state-owned banks, 35 foreign exchange private banks, 36 non-
foreign exchange private banks, 26 regional government-owned banks, 17 joint-
venture banks and 11 foreign banks.  This number compares with a total of 222 banks 
which were in existence at the end of December 1997 and reflects a post-Asian 
financial crisis policy of consolidation through liquidation and suspension, as agreed 
with the IMF following the  country’s bailout (see Jao, 2001, Chapter 2), and more 
recently, though officially-encouraged mergers.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 That is, since the Asian financial crisis (AFC) in 1997/98, Indonesia has seen a 
complete transformation of its financial services industry compared with that which 
operated under the General Soeharto regime.  The AFC saw Indonesia sign a ‘Letter 
of Intent’ on 13th October 1997 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reform 
the banking system and its operations and supervision.  The country pledged that 
“insolvent banks have been closed and weak, but viable, institutions have been 
required to formulate and implement rehabilitation plans.  At the same time, steps are 
being taken to minimize future systemic risks.  In particular, the legal and regulatory 
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environment will be strengthened by establishing strong enforcement mechanisms and 
introducing a stringent exit policy,” (‘Letter of Intent’ paragraph 24, Indonesia, 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/idn/).  However, given the problems surrounding 
the financial crisis, where Indonesia was the worst affected (see Jao, 2001, Chapter 2), 
there was no quick solution to overcoming the country’s inherent internal problems 
(Sato, 2005). 
 Whilst the IMF was supervising the transformation of the Indonesian financial 
system up to 2003, the Indonesian government introduced the Central Bank Act (Act 
No. 23) of 1999, which gave independence to Bank Indonesia.  This was then 
superseded by the 2004 amendment to the Central Bank Act of 1999 which enhanced 
the representation of and supervision by government officials, and reintroduced Bank 
Indonesia’s status as ‘lender of last resort’.  Since then, the evolution of supervision 
and regulation has continued, embracing, inter alia, the introduction of deposit 
guarantees and the establishment of a Financial Stability Net (involving Bank 
Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance and the Deposit Guarantee Agency (LPS)) in 
March 2007.   
 The latter developments are consistent with the aim of Bank Indonesia to see a 
more stable banking environment by reducing the number of banks in the country.  
This was implemented in three different ways.  The first was that banks must have a 
minimum Tier I capitalisation of Rp 80 billion (US$ 8.81 billion) by 2007, increasing 
to Rp 100 billion (US$10.2 billion) by 2010; hence, many small private banks would 
be priced out of the market and would have to merge.1  Secondly, in June 2006, Bank 
Indonesia introduced the ‘single presence policy’ that prohibits investors from holding 
more than 25% of the shares of more than one bank.  This creates problems, not only 
for multiple holdings by foreign investors but also for the government itself, which 
owns stakes in five of the country’s largest banks, including Bank Mandiri, Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Negara Indonesia.  It is hoped that the ‘single presence 
policy’ will lead to further consolidation within the industry in the coming years.  
Finally, the Financial Stability Net, introduced in 2007, saw a reduction in the 
depositor guarantee level from Rp 2 billion to Rp 100 million (US$11,000), which 
covers 98% of all depositors and 38% of deposits.  Given the increased risk of holding 
                                            
1
  The rise in the Tier I minimum capital requirement is due to the central bank’s feeling that, presently, 
50 out of the 130 banks operating in Indonesia are too small and hence mergers are the only viable 
option to ensure the future stability of the financial system.  
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cash in banks in excess of the deposit guarantee level it is hoped that investors will be 
more selective in their choice of bank, leading to a natural consolidation in the 
financial services industry in Indonesia. 
 In summary, the changes outlined above and set in train by Bank Indonesia 
allowed the banks to put many of their previous problems behind them and 
contributed towards increased financial stability in Indonesia.  Hence, 2007 is an ideal 
year in which to analyse Indonesian bank efficiency.  We next discuss the data and 
methodology used to estimate the efficiencies across the different sectors of the 
Indonesian banking system. 
 
 
3.  DATA AND MODELLING METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Estimation of Efficiency 
 
Estimation of a bank’s level of efficiency involves a comparison of its actual 
and best possible performances, given the inputs and outputs specified.  In this study, 
we focus on input-reduction strategies and evaluate input-oriented efficiency 
measures estimating by how much banks could reduce the usage of their resources 
(inputs) given the outputs they produce.  Formally, the optimum level of inputs is 
given by the relevant frontier which represents the common technology T  banks use 
to transform inputs X (m × n) into outputs Y (s × n), given by equation (1): 
 
    { }YproducecanX|)Y,X(T =    (1) 
 
However, given that the true frontier is not observable, it can be approximated 
by a ‘best-practice’ frontier, in which the literature has posited two estimation 
approaches, the non-parametric and parametric methodologies.  The former approach 
is based on mathematical programming and the latter makes use of econometric 
estimation techniques.  The advantages of the non-parametric technique is that it does 
not assume any functional form in the construction of the frontier unlike its 
parametric counterparts (for further discussion, see Coelli et al. 2005).  In this paper, 
we utilise the non-parametric linear programming technique, DEA, which originated 
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from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and was later extended by Charnes et al., (1978), 
Banker et al. (1984) and Färe et al. (1985), to estimate the frontier.  In addition, the 
individual input-oriented efficiency for each bank is computed relative to the 
estimated frontier by solving the Slacks-Based Model (SBM) DEA linear 
programming problem, as suggested by Tone (2001).  The SBM efficiency estimator 
takes into account the input slacks arising in a bank’s production.  In the analysis of 
public sector DMUs, for which DEA was originally proposed by Farrell (1957), the 
idea of slacks was not a problem unlike when DEA is employed to measure cost 
efficiencies in a ‘competitive market’ setting.  Hence, in a ‘competitive market’ 
setting, output and input slacks are essentially associated with the violation of ‘neo-
classical’ assumptions.  For example, in an input-oriented approach, the input slacks 
would be associated with the assumption of strong or free disposability of inputs 
which permits zero marginal productivity of inputs and hence extensions of the 
relevant isoquants to form horizontal or vertical facets.  In such cases, units which are 
deemed to be radial or ‘Farrell efficient’ (in the sense that no further proportional 
reduction in inputs is possible without sacrificing output), may nevertheless be able to 
implement further reductions in some inputs.  Such additional potential input 
reductions are typically referred to as non-radial input slacks, in contrast to the radial 
slacks associated with DEA or Farrell inefficiency, that is, radial deviations from the 
efficient frontier.  To overcome these potential violations of the neo-classical 
assumptions in production modelling, Tone’s (2001) SBM efficiency estimator is 
estimated and is given by the following formula:  
 
   min   ∑
=
−
−=ρ
m
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m
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   subject to  −+λ= sXx o ,    (2) 
      
+
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   and  ,0s,0s,0 ≥≥≥λ +−  
 
where an optimal solution of the SBM program (2) is given by )sˆ,sˆ,ˆ,ˆ( +−λρ .  In 
particular, ρˆ  is the estimated input-oriented efficiency score of the bank, λˆ  is the 
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estimated intensity variable and represents the peers of the considered bank, and −sˆ  
and +sˆ  are the estimated output shortfalls and input excesses respectively. 
 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that program (2) requires positive inputs 
when estimating efficiency scores but allows outputs to have negative values.  For 
example, if output variables are found to be negative, then program (2) allows for 
these negative outputs to be translated, that is, an arbitrary number can be added to the 
output vector resulting in the non-negativity of all elements of that output vector.  
However, in the case of banking, especially as bank balance sheets change to 
incorporate new trading positions, the case of only having to translate one side of the 
input or output variable vector is becoming rarer.  That is, in our sample of Indonesian 
banks, off-balance-sheet outputs can be positive or negative dependent on the trading 
position in that quarter, and total provisions, which are used as an input (commonly 
now utilised in the bank modelling literature and explained in more detail below), 
could also be positive or negative according to whether the bank increased or 
decreased those said provisions in the quarter under study.  Hence, to overcome the 
limitations inherent in the standard SBM program when one or more inputs and 
outputs have negative values, the Modified Slack-Based Model (MSBM) can be 
utilised (see, Sharp et al., 2006) in accordance with program (3): 
 
   min   ∑
=
−−
−=ρ
m
1k
kok P/s
m
11))x(Ty,x(ˆ  
   subject to −+λ= sXx o ,    (3) 
     
+
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where −koP  is a range of possible improvements for inputs of bank o and is given by 
)x(minxP kiikoko −=
−
. 
Finally, to test which bank-specific factors have an impact on banking 
efficiency, in the second stage of this analysis the efficiency measures jρˆ , estimated 
using programs (2) or (3), are regressed on jz , a set of explanatory variables such as 
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ownership, type and size dummy variables.  The specification of the truncated 
regression used in this study is as follows:  
 
    1z0 jjj ≤ε+β+α=ρ≤     (4) 
 
where β is a vector of parameters associated with each factor to be estimated.  The 
distribution of the error term jε  is assumed to be truncated normal with zero mean 
and unknown variance.  The left and right truncation points of the s'jε  distribution 
are )z( jβ−  and )z1( jβ−  respectively.  
We correct the efficiency scores jρˆ  for the biased term using an adapted 
Algorithm 2 of Simar and Wilson (2007) for left and right truncation points, as 
suggested by Kenjegalieva et al. (2008).2  The bias arises due to the piecewise linear 
frontier used as a benchmark (the true frontier is smooth) and the differences in the 
environment in which banks operate.  In addition, it can potentially capture leads 
and/or lags in the variables used in the panel data analysis as well as some reporting 
errors of the data.  Mathematically, it is expressed as equation (5), 
 
  
)Ty,x())Ty,x(ˆ(E))Ty,x(ˆ(BIAS iii ρ−ρ≡ρ    (5) 
 
and decreases asymptotically with an increase in the number of observations in the 
sample and in the number of bootstrapped iterations, and with a reduction in the 
number of input/output variables considered.  
In the first bootstrap procedure, we correct efficiency scores for the estimated 
bias by running 100 iterations.  The second bootstrapping technique ensures that the 
problem of serial correlation of the efficiency measures is avoided.  This involved 
performing 5000 bootstrap replications.  Once the set of bootstrap parameter estimates 
for β and εσ  have been obtained, the percentile bootstrap confidence intervals are 
                                            
2
  Alternative approaches to the technique of Simar and Wilson (2007) are those of Daraio and Simar 
(2005) and Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007).  The former use a probabilistic formulation of the frontier 
whereas the latter use a combination of non-parametric kernel regression and bivariate density 
estimation in the second stage.  Although the utilised Simar and Wilson (2007) technique makes 
several assumptions, including the truncated normal distribution of (in)efficiency, it corrects the 
efficiency measures for the bias arising from the environment that the banks operate in.   
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constructed (for further details on the bootstrapping techniques utilised see 
Kenjegalieva et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.  Data and Input/Output Variables 
 
This paper utilises quarterly supervisory data from Bank Indonesia and covers 
the four quarters of 2007 in which all 130 Indonesian banks feature in the sample.  In 
modelling the intermediation approach, we specify three outputs and four inputs, in 
line with Sealey and Lindley (1977).  The first output is ‘total loans’ (total customer 
loans), the second output is ‘other earning assets’ (placements in Bank of Indonesia + 
interbank assets + securities held + other claims + equity participation + cash), and the 
third output is ‘net total off-balance-sheet income’ (net income from 
dividends/fees/commissions/provisions + net income from forex/derivative 
transactions + (securities appreciation - securities depreciation) – insurance expenses 
– capital market transactions).  The third output variable set is included in the analysis 
to reflect the fact that banks around the world have been diversifying, at the margin, 
away from traditional financial intermediation (margin) business and into “off-
balance-sheet” and fee income business.  Hence, it would be inappropriate to focus 
exclusively on earning assets as this would fail to capture all the business operations 
of modern banks.  The inclusion of ‘net total off-balance-sheet income’ is therefore 
intended to proxy the non-traditional business activities of Indonesian banks. 
The inputs estimated in the intermediation approach are: ‘total consumer 
deposits and commercial borrowing’ (demand deposits + saving deposits + time 
deposits + liabilities to Bank of Indonesia + inter-bank liabilities + securities issued + 
borrowings + other payables + guarantee deposits + inter office liabilities); ‘total 
employee expenses’ (total salaries and wages + total educational spending); ‘total 
non-employee expenses’ (R & D + rent + promotion + repair and maintenance + 
goods and services + other costs); and ‘total provisions’ (allowances for loan losses).  
With respect to the last-mentioned input variable, it has long been argued in the 
literature that the incorporation of risk/loan quality is vitally important in studies of 
banking efficiency.  Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), for example, utilising a profit 
function approach, include equity capital “to control, in a very rough fashion, for the 
potential increased cost of funds due to financial risk” (page. 312).  Altunbas et al. 
(2000) and Drake and Hall (2003) also find that failure to adequately account for risk 
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can have a significant impact on relative efficiency scores.  In contrast to Akhigbe and 
McNulty (2003), however, Laevan and Majnoni (2003) argue that risk should be 
incorporated into efficiency studies via the inclusion of loan loss provisions.  That is, 
“following the general consensus among risk agent analysts and practitioners, 
economic capital should be tailored to cope with unexpected losses, and loan loss 
reserves should instead buffer the expected component of the loss distribution.  
Consistent with this interpretation, loan loss provisions required to build up loan loss 
reserves should be considered and treated as a cost; a cost that will be faced with 
certainty over time but that is uncertain as to when it will materialise” (page 181).  
We agree with this view and hence also incorporate ‘total provisions’ as an input in 
the relative efficiency analysis of Indonesian banks. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Based on these input and output variables – summary statistics are provided in 
Table 2 - we specify two models: a model with quarterly income and expenses and a 
model based on the original balance sheet and profit/loss accounts, that is, with 
cumulative income and expenses.  The former model captures the quarterly activities 
of the banks, that is, expenses incurred and income earned during the given quarter, 
and banking risk is measured by the change in total provisions.  The latter model, on 
the other hand, covers the activities of the banks from the beginning of the year to the 
given quarter.  In other words, quarter 3 in this model, for example, covers banking 
activities for 9 months.  It is also interesting to note, that to the authors’ knowledge, 
the data set provided by Bank Indonesia allows for one of the first studies comparing 
efficiency scores between inter-year-quarters and those obtaining at the end of a year.   
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
  
The non-parametric frontier constructed in this study represents the ‘best 
approximated’ frontier as it is based on the practices of all 130 Indonesian banks 
operating in 2007.  The average efficiency scores across the different types of banks 
estimated for both the cumulative model using SBM and for the quarterly model using 
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MSBM are given in Table 3 and bank rankings by average efficiency score are 
presented in Appendix.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
As can be seen from the table, although the efficiency estimates reported by 
the MSBM quarterly model are somewhat higher than those of the SBM cumulative 
model, the results are relatively stable and are not particularly sensitive to either the 
modelling specification or the non-parametric technique utilised.  The exceptions are 
the results for Islamic and regional government-owned banks where the difference in 
efficiency scores for quarters 2, 3 and 4 is over 18% and 13% respectively3.  In 
addition, the average MSBM results for Islamic banks are higher (at 74%) than the 
industry average (67%), whereas the average SBM results for this group (54%) are 
lower than the industry average (62%).4  This result seems to be driven by the 
differences in operating structure of Islamic and conventional banks.  That is, due to 
the profit-sharing nature of Islamic banking and its prohibition on interest-bearing 
investments, these banks perform less efficiently when the modelling is based on 
cumulating off-balance-sheet income.  Indeed, as Table 3 shows, the average 
efficiency of Islamic banks according to the SBM cumulative model decreases 
continuously through the year.  On the other hand, if the analysis is based on a shorter 
time scale (i.e. 3 months), the off-balance sheet income of conventional banks is not 
substantial enough to allow them to be considered as outperforming the Islamic 
banks.  Moreover, according to Tables 4 and 5, the efficiency of the Islamic banks is 
not significantly different from the industry average.  This implies that, although the 
operational structure of Islamic banks is different, in this study they can be considered 
alongside conventional banks in the analysis of Indonesian bank efficiency.   
 
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 
                                            
3
 Given that the expenses in Quarter 1 are the same for both the quarterly expenses and the cumulative 
expenses models, the efficiency results for the given quarter are expected to be fairly similar. The slight 
discrepancy in the efficiency estimates for the quarter is due to the difference in the accounting for 
banking risk captured by provisions.  
4
 To put the average efficiency scores into perspective, the industry average of 62% under the SBM 
model compares with an industry average of 71% for Japanese banks in 2002 under another study of 
South East Asian bank efficiency using the SBM/intermediation approach (see Drake et al., 2009, 
Table 2). 
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Looking at Table 3 again, it can be seen that the average efficiency of listed 
banks, the other group differentiated by “bank status”, consistently exceeds average 
industry efficiency by at least 6%, ranging  from 66% to 78%.  However, the 
regression results –see Tables 3 and 4- imply that it is not statistically different from 
the industry’s performance.  
The impact of ownership on banking efficiency reveals that the state-owned 
banks are the most efficient group of banks in Indonesia.  Their average efficiency 
levels vary between 88% and 100% in the SBM modelling and between 81% and 
100% in the MSBM case, exceeding the industry average by at least 17% on all 
occasions (see Figure 1).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The next best performing groups of banks are the foreign and joint-venture 
banks. The average efficiency of the former group is in the range 72% to 90%.  The 
latter group has average efficiency of between 74% and 86%.  Although the average 
performances of both groups are better than the industry average, they significantly 
lag behind the state-owned banks (Tables 4 and 5).  For example, although the foreign 
banks are the second best according to the cumulative results, their average score of 
84% lies well below the corresponding 94% score of the state-owned banks.  
Similarly, although quarterly financial intermediation performances of the joint-
venture banks are, on average, virtually identical to those of foreign banks – at 80% - 
they are considerably worse than the 91% average score of the state-owned banks. 
As for the rest, the efficiencies of non-foreign exchange and foreign exchange 
bank groups are broadly similar, although the latter slightly outperform the former.  
Meanwhile, the least efficient group of banks is clearly that relating to those banks 
owned by regional governments.  Their efficiency scores are well below the industry 
average and range between 39% and 58% in the cumulative model and between 54% 
and 63% in the quarterly model. In other words, the financial intermediation 
performance of an average bank owned by regional governments could be improved 
by over 33% if they were brought up to the state banks’ level.   
As far as size is concerned, the results suggest that the larger banks are 
significantly more efficient than medium and smaller-sized banks (Tables 4 and 5).  
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As can be seen from Figure 2, while the medium-sized and small banks perform 
slightly below the industry average, the average efficiency level of large banks is 
much higher.  Interestingly, the majority of the large banks are foreign exchange 
private banks (10 out of 17 banks), although the average efficiency of this group is 
lower than the industry average.  The rest of the large bank group comprises 4 state 
banks, 2 foreign banks and a bank owned by a regional government.     
 
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 
 
 The implications of these results are as follows.  Firstly, in cases where both 
Islamic and conventional banks are considered, analysis based on shorter time periods 
(quarterly analysis) allows us to include off-balance-sheet activities into the study 
without over-estimating the performance of conventional banks and under-estimating 
the efficiency of Islamic banks.  Secondly, the activities of banks owned by regional 
governments need closer scrutiny.  As this group of banks holds the third largest share 
(at 9%) of Indonesian customer deposits, the relative intermediation inefficiency of 
this type of banks is somewhat worrying.  Thirdly, the relatively-high efficiency 
rankings of the larger banks and the state-owned banks – see the Appendix - suggest 
that an in-depth study of their operations could be used by regulators to inform the 
debates on how to raise overall levels of performance in the banking industry and on 
bank mergers, which are still being sought to help stabilise the banking and financial 
sectors in Indonesia.  
 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Using a unique dataset provided by Bank Indonesia and adopting input-
oriented SBM (Tone, 2001) and MSBM (Sharp et al., 2006) intermediation-based 
approaches, we have estimated the average efficiencies of Indonesian banks during 
2007, both overall and by group, as determined by size and status.  The results 
demonstrate the following: (i) average bank efficiency within the industry during 
2007 lay between 62% and 67%; (ii) the most efficient group of banks was the ‘state-
owned’ group, recording an average efficiency score of over 90%; (iii) the ‘foreign’ 
banks and ‘joint-venture’ banks were the next best performing groups, both recording 
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average efficiency scores of around 80%; (iv) next in order of the ranking came the 
‘foreign exchange private’ banks and the ‘non-foreign exchange private’ banks 
recording average levels of efficiency of around 60%, just below the industry average; 
(v) the ‘regional government-owned’ banks were shown to be the least efficient – 
worryingly given that they have the 3rd largest share (9% at 1.1.08) of customer 
deposits – recording average efficiency levels of between 45% and 58%; (vi) listed 
banks, with average efficiency levels of around 70%, were shown to be more efficient 
than the average non-listed bank; and (vii) despite their very different operational 
structure when compared with conventional banks, Islamic banks were shown to have 
enjoyed average levels of efficiency of between 54% and 74%. 
 In the second stage of the analysis we employed the bootstrapping 
methodology of Simar and Wilson (2007) to remove the bias in the efficiency 
estimates and to formally test for the impact of size and status on bank efficiency.  
The results demonstrate that the intermediation-based efficiency of regional 
government-owned, foreign exchange, non-foreign exchange, joint-venture and 
foreign groupings are significantly lower than that recorded by the state-owned group, 
with the first-mentioned being the most inefficient and the other groupings ranked in 
ascending order of efficiency, as shown.  Moreover, large banks were shown to be 
significantly more efficient than their smaller counterparts. 
 Finally, it is worth repeating the main policy implications of our study.  
Firstly, given that they have the third greatest share of customer deposits yet are the 
most inefficient group , supervisory resources should be devoted to trying to 
understand why the regional government-owned banks’ intermediation-based 
activities are so inefficient with a view to raising their performance to at least the 
industry average.  Secondly, closer analysis of the operations of the state-owned and 
larger banks might be undertaken with a view to eliciting “best industry practice” and 
disseminating such findings to the rest of the industry.  And,  finally, close inspection 
of the relative efficiency rankings might also be used to inform the continuing debate 
on bank mergers by identifying those tie-ups which are likely to prove most 
beneficial, whether they arise as a result of private sector initiatives or from officially-
sanctioned ‘assisted mergers’, a common feature of banking markets around the world 
as regulators seek to stabilise their financial systems in the wake of the sub-prime 
crisis and the global economic downturn.  The empirical findings that large banks are 
significantly more efficient than their smaller counterparts offers some support to 
 16 
Bank Indonesia’s efforts to force further consolidation in the Indonesian banking 
sector. 
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Table 1 
The Structure of the Indonesian Banking Industry at end-December 2007 
 
Type of Bank* Number of 
Banks 
Total Assets 
(IDR tn.) 
Total Assets 
Share (%) 
State-owned banks 5 742.0 36% 
Foreign exchange private 
national banks 35 768.7 39% 
Non-foreign exchange 
private national banks 36 39.0 2% 
Regional government-
owned banks 26 170.0 9% 
Joint venture banks 17 90.5 5% 
Foreign banks (branching) 11 176.3 9% 
Total 130 1986.5 100% 
 
Note. * There are also 24 listed banks, comprising 17 foreign exchange private banks, 2 non- 
foreign exchange private banks, a regional government-owned bank, a joint  venture bank, and 
3  state-owned banks. As well as this there are 3 Islamic banks, which comprise two foreign 
exchange private banks and a non- foreign exchange private bank.  
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics for Indonesian banks’ Inputs and Outputs in IDR tn. 
(4 quarters 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Quarterly expenses model 
Inputs     
Total non-employee 
expenses incurred during 
the given quarter  
27181 59 435745 65311 
Total consumer deposits 
and commercial 
borrowing 
7679449 5139 147460957 19944439 
Total employee expenses 
incurred during the given 
quarter 
33480 177 848528 97023 
∆ total provisions made 
during the given quarter  -5285 -1598168 439183 94421 
     
Outputs     
Total loans 4256254 2813 71525267 10359452 
Other earning assets 5962014 6669 164157634 19431607 
Net total off-balance sheet 
income earned during the 
given quarter 
16746 -582073 482845 66086 
Cumulative expenses model 
Inputs     
Total non-employee 
expenses  62559 59 1419024 167148 
Total consumer deposits 
and commercial 
borrowing 
7679449 5139 147460957 19944439 
Total employee expenses  80321 194 2989067 257059 
Total provisions 244271 96 10983686 1040628 
     
Outputs     
Total loans 4256254 2813 71525267 10359452 
Other earning assets 5962014 6669 164157634 19431607 
Net total off-balance sheet 
income  45538 -164318 1458077 147743 
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Table 3. 
Average efficiency results for Indonesian banks 
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
2007 2007 2007 2007 
Average 2007   
No. of 
banks SBM 
(Cumul.) 
MSBM 
(Quarter) 
SBM 
(Cumul.) 
MSBM 
(Quarter) 
SBM 
(Cumul.) 
MSBM 
(Quarter) 
SBM 
(Cumul.) 
MSBM 
(Quarter) 
SBM 
(Cumul.) 
MSBM 
(Quarter) 
Bank Status            
Listed banks  24 0.765 0.782 0.679 0.751 0.656 0.704 0.657 0.710 0.689 0.737 
Islamic banks  3 0.720 0.732 0.521 0.817 0.483 0.764 0.449 0.634 0.543 0.737 
Ownership Status 
Groups            
State- Owned  5 1.000 1.000 0.934 0.932 0.879 0.900 0.926 0.814 0.935 0.912 
Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  35 0.699 0.763 0.576 0.699 0.565 0.587 0.569 0.564 0.602 0.653 
Non-Foreign Exchange 
Private Banks  36 0.682 0.666 0.554 0.615 0.518 0.612 0.514 0.603 0.567 0.624 
Regional Government-
Owned banks  26 0.583 0.628 0.435 0.578 0.407 0.565 0.387 0.538 0.453 0.577 
Joint Venture Banks  17 0.820 0.816 0.786 0.860 0.743 0.742 0.821 0.768 0.792 0.797 
Foreign Banks  11 0.818 0.852 0.843 0.877 0.818 0.751 0.895 0.717 0.843 0.799 
Size Groups 
 
          
Small  40 0.694 0.672 0.596 0.645 0.552 0.650 0.554 0.619 0.600 0.646 
Medium  73 0.681 0.698 0.566 0.653 0.537 0.628 0.553 0.614 0.584 0.648 
Large  17 0.860 0.876 0.794 0.854 0.804 0.783 0.895 0.717 0.822 0.823 
Overall Banking 
System  130 0.709 0.713 0.605 0.676 0.576 0.616 0.592 0.639 0.620 0.671 
Note: The average for the year 2007 is the average of the efficiency scores for 4 quarters. The numbers of banks in the ownership status and size groups add up to the total 
number of banks in the banking system. A bank is classified as “small” if its total customer deposits are less than IDR 500,000 tn., “medium” if total deposits range between 
IDR 500,000 tn. and 10,000,000 tn., and “large” if total deposits exceed  IDR 10,000,000 tn.. 
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Table 4. 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: SBM input-oriented 
efficiency measures (cumulative model) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  
Est. Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed -0.033 -0.093 0.031 -0.109 0.047 -0.082 0.020 
Islamic -0.006 -0.117 0.109 -0.147 0.151 -0.100 0.091 
Foreign 
Exchange -0.573* -0.875 -0.378 -0.993 -0.313 -0.821 -0.406 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-0.536* -0.843 -0.336 -0.960 -0.283 -0.781 -0.367 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-0.693* -0.996 -0.490 -1.114 -0.432 -0.943 -0.522 
Joint-
Venture -0.254* -0.559 -0.053 -0.679 -0.003 -0.497 -0.079 
Foreign -0.200*** -0.508 0.012 -0.628 0.077 -0.452 -0.022 
Large 0.310* 0.230 0.391 0.206 0.415 0.242 0.376 
Small -0.037 -0.087 0.015 -0.102 0.029 -0.079 0.006 
Constant 1.160*** 0.962 1.463 0.910 1.583 0.989 1.408 
εσˆ  0.178*** 0.162 0.191 0.158 0.195 0.164 0.188 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the 
bootstrap confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a 
range within which the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies.  
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Table 5. 
Results of the truncated regression with two truncations: MSBM input-oriented 
efficiency measures (quarterly model) 
Bounds of the Bootstrap Est.  Confidence Intervals  Est. 
Coef. 5% low 5% up 1% low 1% up 10% low 10% up 
Listed -0.004 -0.073 0.070 -0.094 0.095 -0.062 0.058 
Islamic 0.064 -0.071 0.210 -0.108 0.260 -0.049 0.187 
Foreign 
Exchange -1.090* -1.736 -0.717 -1.988 -0.626 -1.591 -0.767 
Non-
Foreign 
Exchange 
-1.054* -1.705 -0.675 -1.941 -0.595 -1.554 -0.731 
Regional 
Government 
Owned 
-1.203* -1.855 -0.821 -2.112 -0.730 -1.708 -0.872 
Joint-
Venture -0.769* -1.413 -0.394 -1.636 -0.298 -1.266 -0.446 
Foreign -0.839* -1.480 -0.457 -1.738 -0.357 -1.335 -0.503 
Large 0.321* 0.227 0.422 0.199 0.455 0.241 0.405 
Small -0.064** -0.123 -0.004 -0.141 0.014 -0.112 -0.013 
Constant 1.680* 1.297 2.330 1.214 2.585 1.354 2.190 
εσˆ  0.205* 0.186 0.222 0.181 0.228 0.188 0.218 
Notes: Statistical significance:* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** denotes statistically 
significant at the 5% level; and  *** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level (according to the 
bootstrap confidence intervals). The α-% lower and upper bounds of confidence intervals represent a 
range within which the (100-α) percentile of bootstrapped coefficients lies.  
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Figure 1. 
The average efficiency scores of Indonesian banks by ownership status compared 
with the average efficiency of the banking system 
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Figure 2. 
The average efficiency scores of Indonesian banks by size compared with the 
average efficiency of the banking system 
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Figure 3. 
The share of total customer deposits held by Indonesian banks (by ownership of 
banks) as at 01.01.2008 
State Owned
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Foreign 
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Foreign Exchange 
40%
Non Foreign Exchange
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Appendix 1. Bank rankings by average efficiency scores. 
 
SBM MSBM 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
1.000 1 iiir A, LS L 1.000 1 iiir A, LS L 
1.000 1 iidi A S 1.000 1 iidi A S 
1.000 1 iipi A, LS L 1.000 1 iipi A, LS L 
1.000 1 iihp B, LS L 1.000 1 iira F M 
1.000 1 iibi B, LS L 1.000 1 didi C S 
1.000 1 iibr F M 1.000 1 drqr E S 
1.000 1 iira F M 0.990 7 iiar B, LS L 
1.000 1 iirr F M 0.980 8 iiap B, LS L 
1.000 1 iiqb E M 0.967 9 idii E M 
1.000 1 iddp E S 0.959 10 iibr F M 
1.000 1 idpb E M 0.956 11 idai E M 
1.000 1 didi C S 0.955 12 ipsp D M 
1.000 1 drqr E S 0.946 13 iirr F M 
0.996 14 iiar B, LS L 0.942 14 idpb E M 
0.972 15 iipb B, LS L 0.930 15 iihp B, LS L 
0.965 16 idhr F M 0.928 16 idhr F M 
0.965 17 disa C S 0.910 17 iiqr E M 
0.961 18 irsb B, LS L 0.893 18 idpi E M 
0.960 19 idai E M 0.878 19 dqip E M 
0.952 20 idia F M 0.841 20 iipp A, LS L 
0.945 21 iipp A, LS L 0.833 21 idap F S 
0.929 22 idii E M 0.833 22 irda C S 
0.928 23 dqip E M 0.832 23 irsb B, LS L 
0.888 24 iqpp C S 0.825 24 iihi B, LS L 
0.887 25 idpa E M 0.824 25 iipb B, LS L 
0.880 26 iihb B, LS L 0.803 26 iiqb E M 
0.851 27 idir F M 0.803 27 idpp E M 
0.830 28 idpp E M 0.800 28 iirb F L 
0.821 29 ddii C S 0.796 29 iahi C M 
0.820 30 iiba F M 0.792 30 dima C S 
0.768 31 iiqa E M 0.791 31 iqib B, I M 
0.763 32 idpi E M 0.785 32 idia F M 
0.739 33 iiap B, LS L 0.777 33 disb C S 
0.739 34 dima C S 0.771 34 iphb D M 
0.737 35 irda C S 0.764 35 diqr C S 
0.736 36 iirb F L 0.764 36 iibb F L 
0.732 37 iiqr E M 0.758 37 iddr E M 
0.729 38 iaia A L 0.757 38 iqpp C S 
0.688 39 didb C, I M 0.754 39 iddp E S 
0.683 40 dqia E M 0.750 40 ddii C S 
0.683 41 ipsp D M 0.748 41 ipqr B, I M 
0.667 42 idap F S 0.746 42 irrb B, LS L 
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SBM MSBM 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
0.666 43 irrb B, LS L 0.741 43 ddhb C, LS M 
0.660 44 diqr C S 0.734 44 iqhb C S 
0.660 45 iddr E M 0.733 45 iiqa E M 
0.656 46 iimi F S 0.720 46 iibi B, LS L 
0.646 47 iqar C M 0.718 47 iaia A L 
0.641 48 disb C S 0.715 48 ipap D M 
0.633 49 iibb F L 0.708 49 idmr B M 
0.620 50 ddpr C S 0.701 50 iimb E, LS S 
0.617 51 idqr B, LS M 0.700 51 iihb B, LS L 
0.617 52 idrp B M 0.694 52 iisi B, LS M 
0.614 53 diaa C S 0.686 53 ippa D L 
0.612 54 iphb D M 0.677 54 iisb B L 
0.595 55 ipap D M 0.672 55 didb C, I M 
0.595 56 iiaa B M 0.666 56 dqii E M 
0.591 57 idmr B M 0.663 57 idir F M 
0.587 58 diib C S 0.654 58 idqa B, LS M 
0.585 59 ihpb B M 0.651 59 iqar C M 
0.585 60 iisi B, LS M 0.642 60 iqqp B M 
0.578 61 iapr C M 0.636 61 ihib B M 
0.574 62 ihpp B M 0.631 62 idpa E M 
0.573 63 iisb B L 0.626 63 iqma B M 
0.572 64 dirr C S 0.611 64 drqa E S 
0.567 65 iqrb C S 0.610 65 ippb D M 
0.565 66 dibb C S 0.610 66 ipbi D M 
0.562 67 iqmp C S 0.606 67 diib C S 
0.560 68 ihdr B M 0.603 68 iqmp C S 
0.559 69 idqa B, LS M 0.602 69 ddpi C, LS M 
0.556 70 ippa D L 0.596 70 ipar D M 
0.552 71 ddpp C S 0.596 71 iimi F S 
0.551 72 ihdi B M 0.595 72 ddpr C S 
0.550 73 ddhp C S 0.591 73 idqi B S 
0.549 74 dqii E M 0.591 73 ihir B S 
0.543 75 ihib B M 0.589 75 disa C S 
0.541 76 iihi B, LS L 0.589 76 dddi C S 
0.541 77 iphi D M 0.585 77 iphi D M 
0.539 78 disi C S 0.582 78 iimr B, LS M 
0.538 79 iqma B M 0.580 79 ipqa B, LS M 
0.527 80 ihhr B, LS M 0.579 80 ipsa D M 
0.518 81 ipqr B, I M 0.573 81 ipbr D M 
0.514 82 ipqa B, LS M 0.570 82 disi C S 
0.511 83 ipba D M 0.569 83 idqr B, LS M 
0.507 84 dihi C S 0.568 84 ipma D, LS M 
0.494 85 dimb C S 0.564 85 iphp D M 
0.490 86 ihhb C S 0.557 86 ihdi B M 
0.488 87 ipbp D M 0.557 87 ipmp D S 
0.486 88 iimr B, LS M 0.553 88 diaa C S 
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SBM MSBM 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
Eff. 
score 
Ranking Bank 
name 1 
Type of 
bank 2 
Size 
grouping 3 
0.478 89 ddhb C, LS M 0.549 89 ipsb D M 
0.477 90 ipar D M 0.549 90 dibb C S 
0.475 91 idri B S 0.548 91 ipbp D M 
0.473 92 iqqp B M 0.547 92 ddhr C M 
0.462 93 iqra C M 0.546 93 ihpp B M 
0.458 94 ipha D M 0.545 94 ipha D M 
0.454 95 iphp D M 0.541 95 irar C S 
0.449 96 ihpr B S 0.540 96 ddhp C S 
0.448 97 idsb B, LS M 0.538 97 iapr C M 
0.447 98 ipsi D M 0.538 98 dihi C S 
0.446 99 ipab D M 0.536 99 ihpb B M 
0.442 100 ddda C M 0.536 100 dirr C S 
0.441 101 ihhp B S 0.536 101 dqia E M 
0.433 102 ipsb D M 0.534 102 ipba D M 
0.429 103 ipbr D M 0.533 103 ipaa D M 
0.427 104 ippb D M 0.533 104 dimb C S 
0.426 105 dddi C S 0.529 105 ihhb C S 
0.424 106 iqib B, I M 0.527 106 ipsi D M 
0.419 107 irar C S 0.527 107 ddpp C S 
0.418 108 ipai D M 0.527 108 ihhp B S 
0.415 109 iphr D M 0.525 109 iqra C M 
0.413 110 ipbi D M 0.524 110 ipai D M 
0.412 111 ipmi D M 0.521 111 ihhr B, LS M 
0.407 112 ihir B S 0.520 112 diii C S 
0.400 113 iahi C M 0.519 113 ddda C M 
0.395 114 diii C S 0.519 114 iqrb C S 
0.394 115 ipsa D M 0.519 115 iiba F M 
0.393 116 drqa E S 0.518 116 iiaa B M 
0.390 117 ipqb B, LS M 0.511 117 ihdr B M 
0.390 118 iimb E, LS S 0.511 118 diab C S 
0.386 119 ipma D, LS M 0.510 119 ipab D M 
0.380 120 ippr D M 0.509 120 idrp B M 
0.378 121 ipaa D M 0.509 121 ipqb B, LS M 
0.371 122 ddhr C M 0.507 122 idri B S 
0.369 123 dihr C S 0.504 123 dihr C S 
0.363 124 ddpi C, LS M 0.495 124 idsb B, LS M 
0.356 125 ipsr D M 0.495 125 ipbb D M 
0.351 126 iqhb C S 0.491 126 iphr D M 
0.338 127 diab C S 0.486 127 ihpr B S 
0.337 128 ipmp D S 0.467 128 ipmi D M 
0.323 129 ipbb D M 0.466 129 ipsr D M 
0.286 130 idqi B S 0.461 130 ippr D M 
Notes:  1.   Codes are used to preserve anonymity. 
2. A = state-owned, B = foreign exchange, C = non-foreign exchange, D = regional 
government-owned, E = joint venture, F = foreign, I = Islamic, LS = listed. 
3. S = small, M = medium, L = large. 
 
